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As robots are increasingly deployed in settings requiring social interaction, research is
needed to examine the social signals perceived by humans when robots display certain
social cues. In this paper, we report a study designed to examine how humans interpret
social cues exhibited by robots.We ﬁrst provide a brief overview of perspectives from social
cognition in humans and how these processes are applicable to human–robot interaction
(HRI). We then discuss the need to examine the relationship between social cues and
signals as a function of the degree to which a robot is perceived as a socially present
agent. We describe an experiment in which social cues were manipulated on an iRobot
AvaTM mobile robotics platform in a hallway navigation scenario. Cues associated with
the robot’s proxemic behavior were found to signiﬁcantly affect participant perceptions of
the robot’s social presence and emotional state while cues associated with the robot’s
gaze behavior were not found to be signiﬁcant. Further, regardless of the proxemic
behavior, participants attributed more social presence and emotional states to the robot
over repeated interactions than when they ﬁrst interacted with it. Generally, these results
indicate the importance for HRI research to consider how social cues expressed by a
robot can differentially affect perceptions of the robot’s mental states and intentions. The
discussion focuses on implications for the design of robotic systems and future directions
for research on the relationship between social cues and signals.
Keywords: human–robot interaction, intention recognition, social signals, social cues, social presence, theory of
mind, emotion attribution
INTRODUCTION
The infusion of robots into society has expanded from industri-
alized environments to increasingly complex operations and even
personal service contexts (Jones and Schmidlin, 2011). Robots are
nowengaged in human–robot interaction (HRI),not just in indus-
trialized settings, but also in healthcare (e.g., Mutlu and Forlizzi,
2008), education (e.g., Saerbeck et al., 2010), therapeutic contexts
(e.g., Ferrari et al., 2009; Robins et al., 2009), and in military (e.g.,
Yamauchi, 2004) and civil service operations (e.g., Murphy, 2004).
This has created a tremendous amountof research addressing tech-
nological issues, ranging from robotic movement and control in
engineering, to modeling cognition and social behavior in com-
puter and cognitive science. One of the more pressing challenges
regarding HRI is social cognition and the development of social
capabilities in robots. Many robots still lack the ability to exhibit
non-verbal social cues in ways that humans ﬁnd natural and easy
to understand, which is problematic for action and intention
understanding (e.g., Breazeal, 2004). As the level of collaboration
betweenhumans and robots increases (e.g., in human–robot team-
work), these facets of interaction are increasingly critical because
they directly impact a robot’s ability to effectively coordinate and
cooperate with humans (Dautenhahn, 2007a). As such, research is
needed to develop social-cognitive models supporting the ability
of robots to interpret social cues so as to understand the inten-
tions behind such actions, as well as understand how to display
the appropriate social cues that can signal its own intentions to a
human (see Breazeal et al., 2005).
The past decades have seen a number of interdisciplinary
approaches addressing this problem, including social robotics
(e.g., Fong et al., 2003) and social signal processing (SSP; Vincia-
relli et al., 2009, 2012). At a general level, such research examines
how robotic systems can interact with humans in a natural way.
This requires a sophisticated formof social cognitionwhere robots
and people are able to infer each other’s intentions and attribute
meaning to actions. In this context, our stepping-off point for
the experiment reported in this paper is research in social signals.
Generally, the study of social signals is a multidisciplinary ﬁeld
developing conceptual analyses, tools, and technologies that allow
computer systems, such as robots, to be able to correctly perceive,
accurately interpret, and appropriately display what we call social
cues and translate these into social signals (Vinciarelli et al., 2009,
2012; Pantic et al., 2011).We focus on a small aspect of this research
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to examine a subset of cues exhibited by a robotic system and how
this social display is interpreted by humans; that is, how these cues
are transformed into signals by humans interacting with the robot.
Importantly, we also consider how people both perceive the robot
as an entity in a shared space and perceive the robot as a social
agent capable of perceiving the person.
The purpose of our research is to examine the social cues associ-
atedwithmental state attribution, or howwe understand themind
of others during interaction. Speciﬁcally, our goal is to understand
the relationship between the manifestation of social cues and how
these are translated to social signals that lead to an ability to infer
the intentions of robotic agents. The outcomes of such research are
two complementary aspects of a social signaling framework. First,
we hope to garner a better understanding of the cues associated
with particular mental state attributions. At a theoretical level, this
will help provide foundational knowledge on social signaling and
speciﬁc foci for attention to salient cues and their meaning. Sec-
ond, at a practical level, this understanding can be used to make
recommendations for the requirements of robots exhibiting par-
ticular social cues. For example, speed of approach (a social cue),
can be used to convey a sense of urgency (a social signal). From
this, we will be able to recommend the parameters driving these
attributions, and the metrics within these parameters for robotic
design in HRI.
We view social cues and social signals as the basic conceptual
building blocks of the kind of social intelligence necessary for
interaction between humans and robots. We base this on the mul-
tidisciplinary approach of SSP (Vinciarelli et al., 2009, 2012) in
which the goal is to understand social cognition as it relates to
how social cues and signals are interpreted. Social intelligence is
viewed as the skilled use of interpretation and expression in sup-
port of interactions. Social cues can be deﬁned as biologically and
physically determined features salient to observers because of their
potential as channels of useful information. These can be opera-
tionalized as short, discrete sets of physical and behavioral features
in a person or group (Streater et al., 2012). Physical cues consist of
aspects of physical appearance and environmental factors, such
as the distance between a social agent and an observer. By con-
trast, behavioral cues consist of non-verbal movements, actions,
and gestures as well as verbal vocalizations and expressions using
the body and face. Examples include eye movements, head nods,
smiles, laughter, and arm positioning (Pantic et al., 2011; Vincia-
relli et al., 2012). We consider social signals as semantically higher
than social cues and as being emotionally, cognitively, socially,
and culturally based. More speciﬁcally, social signals can be oper-
ationalized as meaningful interpretations based on mental states
and attitudes attributed to another agent (Streater et al., 2012).
Examples include dominating, ﬂirting, attention, empathy, polite-
ness, or agreement (Pantic et al., 2011; Vinciarelli et al., 2012). We
maintain that this distinction between social cues and social sig-
nals is warranted given that contextual and cultural factors will
inﬂuence how social cues are interpreted. As such, separating the
social cue (i.e., the action itself) from the social signal (i.e., how
an action is interpreted), provides an important level of clarity
for research in HRI. From the standpoint of theory development,
this allows us to more carefully distinguish between, and elabo-
rate upon, how physical activities are differentially translated into
meaning, dependent upon the context or the culture of the inter-
action. Further, from the standpoint of technology, this distinction
provides more precise guidance for modeling social cognition in
varied contexts and for specifying the types of cues robots must
exhibit that are most likely to produce particular types of signals
as interpreted by humans (Streater et al., 2012).
In this context, the aim of this paper is to examine how
social cues expressed by a robot affect the human understand-
ing of robot mental states (i.e., signals), so as to interpret and
understand robot intentions. To meet this objective, we ground
this work within the framework of human social cognition,
with a particular focus on research regarding human attribution
of social qualities to machines. The present research examined
the effects of the social cues (gaze and proxemic behavior), as
instantiated in a non-humanoid robot platform, on social sig-
nals, operationalized as perceived social presence and emotional
state attributions to the robot. Accordingly, research regarding
the importance of social cues for understanding intentions in
both human–human interactions (HHIs) and HRIs is next brieﬂy
reviewed. In this, we weave together a set of theoretical con-
cepts we argue can contribute to understanding intentions during
HRI.
Currently, perspectives on social cognition in humans are
aligned in their view that an integrated set of mechanisms is
employed in understanding both the self and the intentions and
mental states of other social agents (e.g., Baldwin and Baird, 2001;
Beer and Ochsner, 2006; Chiavarino et al., 2012). There is also
increasing support from a number of disciplines that this is done
using automatic and/or deliberate processes (see Lieberman, 2007;
Apperly and Butterﬁll, 2009; Bohl and van den Bos, 2012). Typi-
cally, the purpose of employing such social cognitive mechanisms
is that in gaining an understanding of othersmental states, onewill
be able to respond and interact appropriately as well as anticipate
future states (e.g., Przyrembel et al., 2012).
When applied to human–machine interactions, human social
cognitive mechanisms seem to elicit a tendency to treat machines
as social agents. Interestingly, this tendency appears to be auto-
matic and implicit (Nass et al., 1993; Reeves and Nass, 1996; Nass
and Moon, 2000; Takayama and Pantofaru, 2009; Mumm and
Mutlu, 2011). However, several recent HRI studies have shown
that, within some contexts, participants will explicitly consider
and treat a robot as an autonomous social agent (Saulnier et al.,
2011; Kahn et al., 2012a,b). Therefore, using a framework of how
humans process human social signals and apply it to HRI seems
promising.
We argue that to apply social cognition to HRI, SSP should be
leveraged to better understand the role of social cues and signals
in inﬂuencing one’s perceptions of a robot as a social agent. As
described earlier, SSP is a rapidly developing ﬁeld that aims to
understand social cognition and the ways in which social cues and
signals can be interpreted and conveyed by computerized systems
(Vinciarelli et al., 2009, 2012). Recent efforts have built on this
as a foundation for explicating social dynamics in the context of
HRI for both robot and human social perception and interaction
(Bockelman Morrow and Fiore, 2012; Streater et al., 2012; Lobato
et al., 2013; Wiltshire et al., 2013a). Understanding the exchange
of social cues and the resultant social signals just in HHIs is a
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challenge because they come in an almost innumerable quan-
tity of combinations that are context dependent (Vinciarelli et al.,
2012). Nonetheless, as robotic systems increasingly enter society,
research is needed to better understand this exchange as it occurs
between humans and robots. While there exists some research
on the types of physical and behavioral cues conveyed by robots,
even if such cues were intended or programmed to communi-
cate a certain signal, less work has explored how those signals are
actually perceived by humans (see Cabibihan et al., 2012; DeSteno
et al., 2012, for examples). Such efforts are necessary given that
an ultimate goal for the development of robotic teammates is
for humans to intuitively understand the intentions of the robot
during a given interaction in order to facilitate effective communi-
cation and shared situation understanding (e.g., Klein et al., 2004;
Pezzulo, 2012).
For the successful exchange of social signals between humans
and robots, we suggest that humans must consider the robot as
a social agent so as to perceive the cues as social in nature and
then work to recognize intentions. In the context of HRI, this is
thought of as the degree to which the robot is perceived as socially
present (Jung and Lee, 2004). Social presence can be deﬁned as
the degree to which an agent perceives being in the company of
another social agent (Harms and Biocca, 2004) and is thought
to be key for gaining a sense of accessibility or understanding of
another agent’s intentional, psychological, and emotional states
(Biocca and Harms, 2002). Further, social presence is also the
degree to which a technology is able to scaffold and elicit a sense
of social interaction (de Greef and Ijsselsteijn, 2000; Fiore et al.,
2003) and more pertinently, is a theory of how technology may
affect, distort, and enhance certain social–cognitive processes in
humans (Biocca and Harms, 2002).
In short, social presence theory aims to describe the processes
through which humans are able to understand the intentions of
others, with an emphasis on how this is done during social interac-
tionswith artiﬁcial agents and/or technologicallymediated human
interaction (Biocca andHarms, 2002). As such, examining the per-
ceived social presence of a robot enables assessment of the degree
to which humans understand its intentions. For research in HRI,
we suggest that an important question to consider, in the context
of social–cognitive mechanisms, is the degree to which robots are
able to convey a sense of social presence as a function of the social
cues they display and the social signals that the cues convey to an
observer.
Given the upsurge of distributed and virtual interaction in the
early part of the twenty-ﬁrst century, a tremendous amount of
research has examined themanyways social presence has impacted
human behavior. This ranged from studies of how distribution
alters teamwork (e.g., Driskell et al., 2003) to how interaction with
avatars changes behavior (e.g., Slater et al., 2000). As part of this
research,Harms andBiocca (2004) developed the networkedminds
social presence inventory (NMSPI) to examine perceptions of self
and another when interacting through technology. The NMSPI
asks participants a series of questions about their own perceptions
of another entity as well as to assess how the other entity perceives
the participant, while taking into account the symmetry of the
interaction (Abeele et al., 2007). For example, two questions from
this scale are “It was easy for me to understand (my partner)” and
“(My partner) found it easy to understand me.” The remaining
questions in this scale follow the same structure, in that pairs of
questions have the opposite subject and object. In instances where
the participant is the object, the questionnaire asks participants to
judge the mental states of the other entity during the interaction.
In this way, the NMSPI prompts participants to make mental state
attributions, that is, to engage in theory of mind mentalizing,
about the capabilities of the other entity. Thus, the NMSPI allows
for the deliberate employment of social cognitive mechanism to
allow for the investigation of attributions of the mental states of
another agent.
In short, an important distinction within the NMSPI has to do
with attributions about the self as opposed to attributions about
some other. Although this distinction was not made explicit in
the original development of the NMSPI measure, this enables
researchers to analyze responses along the symmetry of self and
other attributions within an interaction (Abeele et al., 2007) in
order to uniquely examine the different ways social presence is
related to cues and signals. Importantly, components of this scale
have been used previously in HRI research (Leite et al., 2009).
In this work, Leite and colleagues were interested in changes in
perceived social presence over long-term HRIs. The researchers
examined children’s perceived social presence of an iCat robot in
a game playing context over a 5-week period of time. Their results
showed a decrease in perceived social presence over time, though
the authors suggest that the limited context of the interactions and
the relatively limited capabilities of the robot were not sufﬁcient to
maintain the appearance of a socially present agent. Nonetheless,
this is relevant because it shows that theNMSPI, though developed
originally to examine social presence of another human, can also
be a useful instrument in exploring the perceived social presence
of a distinctly non-human entity like a robot.
While the NMSPI is a measure of social presence, we sug-
gest that, in the context of HRI, the distinction between self- and
other-attributions, inherent to the measure, is a potentially useful
research approach. From this, we can examine the relationship
between social cues and signals when a human is interacting with
a non-human entity by using the other-attributions as a means of
assessing how social cues are translated into social signals. In juxta-
position, we are able to apply the NMSPI as a means of measuring
the degree of intention understanding attributed to participants’
selves regarding the robot.
Generally, within HHI, humans make attributions about
another as to their cognitive and/or their emotional states. Meth-
ods such as those described above focus more on the cognitive
facets of intention understanding. But an important compo-
nent of mental state attribution and understanding the intention
of another, is how that entity is feeling (i.e., the entity’s affec-
tive/emotional state). Making mental state attributions about
another’s emotional states is an essential part of the process for
understanding the intentions behind a given action and is often
done from a limited set of observable social cues (e.g., Olsson and
Ochsner, 2008; Mier et al., 2010). Research in this area examines
how factors such as context, expressions, gestures, facial features,
etc., drive the attribution of certain social signals, including emo-
tional and mental states, and the results these have for a given
interaction (Forbes and Grafman, 2013).
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While emotion attribution is clearly related to understanding
the intentions of humans (see Mier et al., 2010), we suggest it may
also be important for HRI. Relatedly, Bethel and Murphy (2008)
highlighted three primary issues relevant to advancing emotional
expression by “appearance-constrained” robots using non-facial
and non-verbal cues. These include: “(1) the development of an
accurate model of emotion generation; (2) how to measure emo-
tional responses to the robot; and (3) how the robot can accurately
convey its role and intent” (Bethel and Murphy, 2008, p. 91).
The importance of understanding how humans attribute emo-
tions to a robotic platform relates to all three of these issues raised
by Bethel and Murphy. Taken together, these suggest that how
humans respond emotionally to a robot will depend on their inter-
pretation of the emotional state of the robot based on the cues it
expresses. Thus, the perceived emotional states of a robot can be
used by humans to augment their understanding of the robot’s
intentions.
A large body of work has explored the underlying dimensions
of emotional states. Fromanumber of experiments, Russell (1980)
derived the circumplex model of affect, which arranges emo-
tional states at equidistant points around a two-dimensional space
representing the orthogonal dimensions of valence and arousal.
Parsing emotions apart from their semantic level of description
(e.g., happy, sad, etc.) to these two underlying dimensions allows
for consideration of the level of positivity/negativity (valence) and
level of activity/inactivity (arousal) associated with a given emo-
tion. Importantly, from this line of work came new measurement
tools, relying on the semantic descriptions, which have often been
used for assessing self-attributions of emotional states (Jacob et al.,
1989), but also for measuring the emotions attributed to others’
facial expressions (Russell et al., 1989). Speciﬁcally, the circular
mood scale (CMS; Jacob et al., 1989), originally developed and
validated for self-assessments of one’s own mood, is an emotional
state measurement tool derived from the circumplex model of
affect that can also be used for the attribution of emotions to
others. In addition to valence and arousal, a third dimension, rep-
resenting intensity of mood, is intrinsic to the CMS. With regard
to emotional state attributions, intensity can range from a neutral
emotional attribution to a very strong attribution of a given emo-
tion. In short, this is a single-itemmeasure that allows participants
to make an attribution using a graphical array of emotions.
Taken together, attributions assessed with the NMSPI can be
seen as more cognitive in nature (e.g., that entity is attending to
me) and those assessedwith theCMSaremore emotional in nature
(e.g., that entity is angry). Because emotion is a foundational
element of social interaction, and, often, a driver of mental state
attribution, we suggest that in HRI, it is essential to examine both
cognitive and emotional mental state attributions made to a robot
as a function of cues displayed by the robot. In doing so, we
are able to assess the resulting social signals (both cognitive and
emotional).
Recent research in robotics has addressed some of the complex-
ities inherent in intention understanding by examining if humans
can accurately interpret “minimal cues.” These are described as
“behaviours that rely on only a few simple physical capabilities
present in (or that can be easily added to) most robots” (Saulnier
et al., 2011, p. 79). Such research has focused on relatively simple
social interactions. For example, in their study of interruption
behaviors, Saulnier et al. (2011) studied what was referred to
as the “physical” aspect of social robotics. This was described
as a fundamental layer of social interaction involving features
such as robotic movement, interpersonal distance, and gaze. The
researchers argued that these represent an important design fea-
ture for social robotics and that this “physical layer” needs to be
considered in the design of robots in order to scaffold intention
understanding. We see these as part of the broader theoretical
framework of social cues and signals in that this physical layer rep-
resents the cues that humans translate into social signals that drive
the ability to understand intentions through observed actions. As
Saulnier et al. (2011, p. 79) noted, action understanding forms an
important aspect of interaction in that even our own “actions are
based on our expectations of how others will understand, interpret
and ultimately respond to our interruption behaviours.”
In the present study, we applied the cues of gaze and proxemic
behavior to an iRobot AvaTM mobile robotics platform, a non-
humanoid robot developed by the company iRobot, in order to
determine how humans perceive these cues during a hallway nav-
igation scenario. These behavioral cues were selected because of
their established importance in both HHIs (e.g., Aiello and Aiello,
1974; Kleinke, 1986) and their increasing prevalence in HRIs (e.g.,
Pacchierotti et al., 2006; Takayama and Pantofaru, 2009; Walters
et al., 2009; Mumm and Mutlu, 2011; Srinivasan et al., 2012).
Although our research was conducted in an experimental
setting, the context for this research was an ecologically valid
interaction. Participants were given the goal of traversing a hall-
way from one end to the other in which they encountered the
robot. The use of a hallway crossing scenario has been used in HRI
research previously, though mostly in service of creating effective
robot navigationmodels (e.g., Pacchierotti et al., 2005), as opposed
to collecting cognitive and behavioral responses by humans (e.g.,
Tsui et al., 2010). The robot in our study was programmed to
traverse half of the hallway from the opposite direction of the
research participant and branch off into an intersecting hall-
way. This scenario was chosen because it is one that would be
very commonly encountered with mobile robots in many settings,
including ofﬁces, hospitals, and other facilities (e.g., Mutlu and
Forlizzi, 2008; Tsui et al., 2010). This ecologically valid interaction
within an experimental setting allowed us to leverage the beneﬁt
of multiple trials along with a realistic experience (as opposed to
a simulation setting). As such, we studied the impact of directly
observable cues potentially driving mental state attribution. From
this, we were able to have an indication of the relation between
readily observable “physical cues” and the types of social signals
arising when such cues are presented.
Gaze is one of the most frequently studied social cues in HHIs
and has been shown to provide useful information that regulates
a given social interaction and facilitates accomplishment of a task
or goal (Kleinke, 1986). Generally, gaze can be deﬁned as a visual
behavior used as a cue for understanding the actions, intentions,
andmental states of others (e.g., Kleinke,1986; Baron-Cohen et al.,
1995). For example,Castiello (2003) found that gaze plays a pivotal
role in understanding themotor actions and intentions of another
person. More recently, in social neuroscience, gaze in an interper-
sonal context has beendemonstrated tobe an expressionof directly
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perceivable embodied intentionality that activates motor and per-
ceptual resonance mechanism to facilitate the understanding of
others actions and intentions (e.g., Gangopadhyay and Schilbach,
2012).
In HRI, social gaze behaviors of a robot have also been shown
as an effective cue that humans can use to understand the behavior
and intentions of a robot (e.g., Srinivasan et al., 2012). For exam-
ple, when a robot providedminimal gaze cues, humans performed
better on a task in which participants were to guess which object
the robot was intending to pick (Mutlu et al., 2009).
At a fundamental level, a robot’s gaze type can be programmed
according to different sets of rules, for example, oriented in the
direction of the robot’s movement vs. oriented toward the nearest
human, and this can have an effect on human behaviors. Mumm
and Mutlu (2011), for example, demonstrated that gaze had dif-
ferential effects on the physical distance humans kept between
themselves and a robot dependent upon whether the humans had
established positive rapport with the robot. Speciﬁcally, if a person
had good rapport with a robot, then differing robot gaze behaviors
did not affect the physical distance humans kept with the robot.
However, if the person had not established good rapport with the
robot (e.g., they did not like the robot), then robot gaze behaviors
oriented toward the person increased the amount of distance the
person maintained between himself and the robot.
Moving from human actions in response to a robot’s gaze to
human attributions of the robot’s social presence and its emotional
states, we apply the previous ﬁndings on the inﬂuence of human
gaze and attributions of emotional states and present the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: the gaze type of the robot will differentially affect
perceived social presence (H1a) and the emotional states attributed
to the robot (H1b).
Proxemic behavior has traditionally been thought of as theways
in which humans utilize, structure, and position their body within
the space around them in relation to other people and objects
(e.g., Hall, 1963). Importantly, the proximity or spatial distance
utilized during a given HHI can specify the type of interaction
as intimate, personal, social, or public (Hall, 1963; Aiello and
Aiello, 1974). Therefore, this cue has important implications for
how a given person is both socially perceived and interacted with.
Developmental research has shown that, as children grow older,
they utilize greater proxemic distance during their interactions
(Aiello and Aiello, 1974). More relevant for the understanding
of intentions, proxemic behavior was found to be an important
predictor of hostile and aggressive intentions on a simulated task
(McCall et al., 2009).
In HRI, proxemic behavior has been extended to study varying
social meanings as a function of the distance in which the robot
comes within the human (e.g., intimate, personal, social, pub-
lic; Pacchierotti et al., 2006). Recent efforts have gone so far as to
develop computational taxonomies from which a bi-directional
intention understanding can be derived as a function of the spa-
tial distance between a human and a robot in a given interaction
(Walters et al., 2009). Of course, human responses to robots as
a function of the robot’s use of proxemics are context dependent,
although research seems to broadly show that this can even impact
humans’ affective states (e.g., Bethel and Murphy, 2008).
In our study, wemanipulated proxemic behavior by varying the
proximity the robot would reach toward the human during the
hallway crossing scenario, either by speeding up and crossing the
human’s paths during the encounter, or by providing the human
more space and waiting until he/she passed. We predicted that the
type of proxemic behavior would inﬂuence human attributions
of the robot’s social presence and emotional states and thus we
present the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: robot proxemic behavior will differentially affect
perceived social presence (H2a) and the emotional states attributed
to the robot (H2b).
In their study investigating the effects of gaze and proxemics in
HRI, Takayama and Pantofaru (2009) demonstrated that the com-
fortable minimal distance between a human and a robot depends,
in part, on gaze behaviors by the robot, such that, when the
robot’s gaze is oriented at a person’s face the comfortable dis-
tance between women and the robot increased, but, between men
and the robot, the comfortable distance decreased. These stud-
ies show that these minimal cues interact, and warrant further
study in social interactions betweenhumans and robots. To expand
on this literature, we postulated the following hypothesis for the
interactive effects of robot gaze and proxemic behavior on human
attributions regarding the robot’s social presence and emotional
state:
Hypothesis 3: robot gaze and proxemic behavior will have interac-
tive effects on the perceived social presence (H3a) and the emotional
states attributed to the robot (H3b).
Most of the HRI research cited above has only examined either
a single interaction between a robot and a human, or collapsed
results from several interactions into a single measure. However,
robots designed for use in social settings are intended to havemul-
tiple interactions with many of the same people over a period of
time. Interacting with robots is a novel experience for most peo-
ple, and attitudes are likely to change as novelty effects wear off.
As such, one of the main themes in HRI research is to consider
howpeople’s perceptions of robots changeover time (Dautenhahn,
2007b).
Recent research that has examined the effects of repeated, or
long-term, interactions with robots has shown that people who
havepreviously interactedwith a robot engage the robot differently
than people who are interacting with the robot for the ﬁrst time.
For example, repeat visitors to a robot receptionist capable of
digitally animated emotional expressions were more likely to have
longer interactions with the robot than those whowere interacting
with it for the ﬁrst time (Gockley et al., 2005) and less likely to
interact with it during times it expressed a negative affect (Gockley
et al., 2006).
More generally, research investigating changes in participant
responses over multiple interactions is still relatively new (Leite
et al., 2013). Given that interaction with robots is still often a
novel experience for most people, we were interested in how
perceptions of the robot would change over time. The current
study adds to this literature by examining changes in participant
perceptions over a series of repeated interactions in the hallway
navigation scenario. While these interactions all occurred within
a relatively short time-span, typically 60–90 min, measures were
taken at multiple time points, allowing for the analysis of changes
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in mental state attributions and perceived social presence over
time. Although this time period is probably not sufﬁcient for nov-
elty effects to be eliminated, we expected that time would have an
effect on human attributions regarding the robot’s social presence
and emotional state and thus pose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: over the course of multiple encounters with the
robot, perceived social presence will increase (H4a) and emotional
states attributed to the robot by participants will change (H4b).
In sum, the primary aim of the present research was to exam-
ine the effects of gaze and proxemic behavior on the perceived
social signals attributed to the robot by human participants. We
sought to extend the literature on gaze and proxemic behavior
in HRI, in order to better understand how instantiation of social
cues in a robot affects human perception of the robot as a social
entity. Through examination of the perceived social presence of
the robot and emotional state attributions as a function of the
manipulated cues, our goal was to examine intention understand-
ing inHRI. The secondary aim of this paper was to investigate how
the behavioral and cognitive responses to a robot exhibiting these
cues change over multiple interactions. In addition, we address
our research question regarding the self- and other-attributions
present within the NMSPI. We expect that, through examination
of the differences between these two types of attributions, as a
function of the social cues conveyed during the interaction, we
will have a proxy for assessing the degree of perceived intention
understanding attributed to the participants and to the robot. In
short, this research will contribute uniquely to the HRI literature
by simultaneously examining multiple social cues, investigating
participants’ changes in perception across repeated interactions,
and by using a single-item measure of affect that has not yet been
utilized in HRI research.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-four (74) volunteer participants (37 females and 37males,
Mage = 19.2 years) from a large southeastern university partici-
pated in this study. Treatment of human subjectswas in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki, was approved by the authors’
Institutional Review Board (IRB), and administratively reviewed
and approved by the funding agency. Data from two participants
were excluded due to technical problems relating to the robot not
maneuvering according to the appropriate programming.
MATERIALS
The experiment was conducted in a large laboratory space, using
a 5 ft. by 30 ft. (approx. 1.5 m × 9.1 m) rectangular hallway con-
structed for this experiment (see Figure 1). An iRobot Ava mobile
robotics platform designed and provided by iRobot, and pro-
grammed speciﬁcally for utilization in this experiment, was used
(see Figure 2). A Hokuyo laser system was used for motion cap-
ture, and three Logitech webcams were used for video recording of
the experiment. Two webcams were located above the experimen-
tal space, each one capturing half of the space from a “bird’s eye
view,” and a third camera was placed at the mid-point of the hall-
way at approximately 1.5 m height, in order to capture participant
behavior from a different perspective. Participants responded on a
FIGURE 1 | Illustrative layout of the experimental space. Participant
starting point is denoted by the red “X” and the robot starting point is
denoted by the blue “O.” Idealized paths to the trial end points are denoted
for the participant and the robot by the red and blue lines, respectively.
FIGURE 2 | iRobot Ava mobile robotics platform and physical
specifications. Primary robot sensors are denoted by “A.”
computer terminal outside the hallway to a number of subjective
measures, described below.
The CMS (Jacob et al., 1989) was used to assess emotions par-
ticipants would attribute to the robot. This measure presents
participants with a circular ﬁgure surrounded by multiple words
denoting eight affective states and eight simple drawings of faces
depicting each emotional state. The graphic is derived from the
circumplex model of affect, which arranges emotional states at
equidistant points around a two-dimensional space representing
the two orthogonal dimensions of valence and arousal (e.g., Rus-
sell, 1980). Valence is represented along the horizontal axis and
arousal is represented along the vertical axis. A third dimension,
representing intensity of emotional state, is also intrinsic to the
CMS, reﬂecting the distance from the center that participants
respond without regard to either valence or arousal.
Four subscales from the NMPSI, a validated measure of social
presence (Harms and Biocca, 2004), were selected for this exper-
iment. The subscales used were co-presence, attentional alloca-
tion, perceived message understanding, and perceived behavioral
understanding. The survey was modiﬁed for the purpose of our
study (e.g., references to “my partner” were replaced with “Ava”
and the word “thoughts” in questions 13 and 14 were changed to
“intentions”). Responseswere given on a 5-point Likert scale (from
“1”= “strongly disagree” to “5”= “strongly agree”). As detailed in
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the introduction, for the present purposes, the research question
of interest regarding the NMSPI was the novel distinction of self-
and other-attributions of social presence, rather than responses
on the traditional subscales (for additional analyses of NMSPI, see
Wiltshire et al., 2013b). Thus, we separated the questions into two
subscales; those related to “self” and those related to “other,” and
analyzed the data at the level of these two subscales.
DESIGN
The basic design of the experiment was a 3 (gaze: congru-
ent, human-oriented, variable; between subjects) × 2 (proxemic
behavior: passive, assertive; within subjects) × 2 (measures taken
after trial 1 and trial 6 for a given proxemic behavior; within
subjects) mixed-model design. Each participant was randomly
assigned to one of the gaze conditions and completed a total of 18
trials, six for the passive proxemic behavior condition and six for
the assertive proxemic behavior (the ﬁnal six trials examined com-
putational factors related to robot navigation and are beyond the
scope of this paper). The blocks of six passive and six assertive trials
were counterbalanced in presentation, such that 50% of the par-
ticipants completed the six passive proxemic behavior trials ﬁrst
and the other 50% completed the six assertive proxemic behavior
trials ﬁrst.
IVs
The independent variable of gaze had three levels, operationalized
as the direction that the robot’s primary sensorswere oriented. The
robot’s sensors were installed on the robot in a way that – both by
location (top) and function (rotating horizontally and indepen-
dently from the robot’s base) – could be perceived by a human
as the robot’s head or eyes (see Figure 2). The three levels of the
gaze variable were congruent, human-oriented, and variable. Con-
gruent gaze was deﬁned as the head consistently being locked in
the direction of the robot’s movement throughout the interaction.
Human-oriented gaze was deﬁned as the head consistently being
oriented approximately at the headof the participant.Variable gaze
was deﬁned as an initial orientation of the robot’s head toward the
participant’s head and then toward the navigation goal. Variable
gaze was considered the most “natural” gaze behavior as it pro-
vided both the cue of sensing the human interactor and the cue of
intended direction of travel.
Proxemic behavior had two levels and was operationalized as
the degree of proximity the robot would allow the human in deter-
mining whether to cross paths or wait until the participant passed.
The passive behavior slowed the robot and modiﬁed the path to
the side of the hall to provide more space for the participant to
pass in front of the robot. The assertive behavior sped up the robot
and modiﬁed the path to “cut the corner” so as to pass in front of
the participant.
DVs
Dependent variables examined in this paper include results of
participant ratings on the NMSPI for each of the four times it
was completed during the experiment: after trial 1, after trial 6,
after trial 7, and after trial 12. Again, this was a ﬁrst and second
measurement for each of the proxemic behaviors parsed according
to whether items represented self- or other-attributions of social
presence. This novel approach for analyzing the NMSPI was used
as a means of measuring the degree of intention understanding
attributed to participants’ selves (subject) regarding the robot as
the object (which we labeled “self”) as well as the degree they
attributed to the robot (subject) with themselves as the object
(which we labeled “other”). The additional dependent variables
include the responses to the CMS along the dimensions of valence,
arousal, and intensity across each of the four measurement times.
PROCEDURE
After providing informed consent, participants were brought into
the experimental space. First, they were seated at a computer ter-
minal and provided a tutorial for how to respond to the CMS,
as this was assumed to be a novel response method for partici-
pants. In this tutorial, participants were presented with the CMS
and an adjective (e.g., JOYFUL) and asked to select a point on
the graphic where they felt was most indicative of the word. They
were informed that the space between two sets of terms repre-
sents the continuum of emotions between those sets, and that the
space between the center and the perimeter represents an intensity
dimension, such that the center point represents the most neu-
tral or muted expressions of an emotion and the perimeter of the
graphic represents the most intense expressions of an emotion.
This training phase consisted of eight such stimuli.
After this phase, participants were brought to the “entry point”
of the hallway. This is where they ﬁrst encountered the robot. At
this point, the video cameras were turned on. Participants were
informed that they would be asked to walk toward the other end
of the hallway when instructed to by the experimenter. The exper-
imenter instructed the participants to walk toward the other end
of the hallway when the robot began moving. After the ﬁrst trial
was completed, participants were asked to sit at the computer in
order to ﬁll out the measures. When responding to the CMS, par-
ticipants were asked to select a point on the graphic to represent
which mood or emotional state they felt the robot was exhibiting.
After completing the measures, participants were brought back
to the entrance of the hallway and completed trials 2 through 6
before responding to the same measures for the second time. Tri-
als 7 through 12 were conducted in the same manner as trials 1
through 6, with participants completing measures twice, speciﬁ-
cally after trials 7 and 12. The participants then completed trials
13 through 18 (which studied other variables and are beyond
the scope of this paper). Once the ﬁnal trial was completed,
participants were also asked to ﬁll out a demographics form.
RESULTS
SOCIAL PRESENCE
We ﬁrst report a series of analyses to understand the impact of
proxemic behavior, gaze, and time on perceived social presence
(hypothesesH1a,H2a,H3a, andH4a). All analyseswere performed
using SPSS version 21 with the alpha level at 0.05, unless otherwise
stated.
The analyses examined social presence along two dimensions:
self-attributions regarding the robot and other-attributions about
the mental states of the robot. Items on the NMSPI with the par-
ticipant as subject (e.g., “It was easy for me to understand Ava”)
were categorized as “self,” and questions where the participant was
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the object (e.g., “Ava found it easy to understand me”) were cat-
egorized as “other.” Because of the modiﬁcations to some of the
items on the NMSPI, the novel method for analyzing the ﬁndings
(i.e., comparing self- and other-attributions), and the use of the
scale across multiple measurement times, internal reliability alpha
coefﬁcients were calculated. These, and the mean values, standard
deviations, and correlations are displayed in Table 1.
The reliability for self-attributions ranged from α = 0.58–0.74
and for other-attributions ranged from α= 0.87–0.90. Traditional
methods for examining the NMSPI (i.e., at the scale and subscale
levels) tend to report reliability levels of α ≥ 0.82 (Harms and
Biocca, 2004), although to the best of our knowledge, no efforts to
date have reported the reliability results with this self- and other-
distinction. As such, it difﬁcult to say whether the lower reliability
for self-attributions tends to be the general case with the NMSPI.
Analysis of social presence
To analyze the effects of the independent variables on measures
of social presence, we then conducted a 3 (gaze) × 2 (proxemic
behavior) × 2 (measurement time) × 2 (focus of the attribution)
mixed-model ANOVA, with gaze as the between-subjects variable
(congruent, human-oriented, or variable), and proxemic behavior
(assertive or passive), time of NMSPImeasure (after trial 1 or after
trial 6 for a given proxemic behavior) and focus of the attribution
in the NMSPI (self- and other-), as the within-subjects variables.
Results indicated a signiﬁcant main effect for proxemic behav-
ior [F(1,69) = 8.08, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.11], such that the mean
score for the Passive behavior (M = 3.69) was greater than the
mean for the assertive behavior (M = 3.53). There was also a sig-
niﬁcant main effect for self- and other-dimensions of the NMSPI
[F(1,69) = 57.66, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.46], such that mean scores
for the self-attributions were greater (M = 3.81) than for other-
attributions (M = 3.42). Finally, the analyses showed a signiﬁcant
main effect for time of measure [F(1,69) = 15.10, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.18], such that mean scores for the ﬁrst time (M = 3.53)
were lower than the mean scores for the second time (M = 3.70).
The main effects were further explained by a signiﬁcant two-
way interaction effect between proxemic behavior and the NMSPI
dimensions of self- and other- [F(1,69) = 42.87, p < 0.001,
FIGURE 3 | Interaction between proxemic behavior condition and
mean scores for self- and other-attributions as measured by the
NMSPI.
η2p = 0.38]. Follow-up pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni
corrections were conducted to better understand the interaction
between proxemic behavior and the self- and other-dimensions
(refer to Figure 3). Speciﬁcally, there was a signiﬁcant difference
among self-attributions between the assertive proxemic behavior
condition (M = 3.87, SE = 0.04) and the passive behavior condi-
tion (M = 3.75, SE= 0.05, p= 0.009). Therewere also signiﬁcantly
lower scores among the other-attributions in the assertive prox-
emic condition (M = 3.20, SE = 0.06) when compared to the
passive condition (M = 3.64, SE = 0.07, p < 0.001).
In order to help address our research question regarding the
NMSPI, we also report on the pairwise comparisons between the
self- and other-attributions. Speciﬁcally, the difference between
the self- and other-attributions for the assertive proxemic behavior
was signiﬁcant, p < 0.001, but there was no signiﬁcant difference
between the self-attributions and other-attributions for the passive
proxemic behavior, p = 0.119.
Finally, a signiﬁcant three-way interaction was found between
proxemic behavior, NMSPI dimensions of self- and other-, and
time of measure [F(1,69) = 8.25, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.11]. We
Table 1 | Mean values, standard deviations, correlations, and internal scale reliability for NMSPI.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Passive time 1 self 3.70 0.50 (0.74)
2. Passive time 1 other 3.48 0.74 0.48*** (0.90)
3. Passive time 2 self 3.80 0.43 0.45*** 0.07 (0.66)
4. Passive time 2 other 3.80 0.63 0.27* 0.63*** 0.34** (0.87)
5. Assertive time 1 self 3.77 0.40 0.16 −0.02 0.37** 0.08 (0.58)
6. Assertive time 1 other 3.15 0.68 0.05 0.14 −0.03 −0.01 0.40*** (0.87)
7. Assertive time 2 self 3.97 0.41 0.40*** 0.06 0.50*** 0.06 0.41*** 0.10 (0.63)
8. Assertive time 2 other 3.23 0.73 0.13 0.08 0.23 0.03 0.10 0.21 0.27* (0.89)
N = 72. Internal scale reliability alpha coefﬁcients are shown in parentheses on the diagonal. In addition, due to a lack of ﬁndings for the gaze manipulation, the values
included here are not grouped along those dimensions.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science November 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 859 | 8
“fpsyg-04-00859” — 2013/11/26 — 13:20 — page 9 — #9
Fiore et al. Social signals in HRI
conducted follow-up pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni cor-
rections for the three-way interaction between proxemic behavior
conditions, the self and other dimensions, and time of measure
(refer to Figure 4 for visual comparison).
Examining the differences between the proxemic behavior con-
ditions revealed that there were no signiﬁcant differences for the
self-attributions at the ﬁrst measure time between the passive
(M = 3.70, SE = 0.06) and assertive (M = 3.77, SE = 0.05)
proxemic behaviors, p = 0.301. Signiﬁcant differences were found,
however, for all other comparisons. At the second time of mea-
sure, self-attribution ratings were higher in the assertive condition
(M = 3.97, SE = 0.05) compared to the passive condition
(M = 3.80, SE = 0.05), p = 0.002. Other-attributions were
higher during the ﬁrst time of measure for the passive condition
(M = 3.48, SE = 0.08) when compared to the assertive condition
(M = 3.16, SE = 0.08), p = 0.004. Comparisons of other-
attributions at the second time of measure revealed signiﬁcantly
lower ratings for the assertive condition (M = 3.24, SE = 0.09)
than for the passive condition (M = 3.80, SE = 0.07), p < 0.001.
These results show that when the robot was behaving according
to the assertive proxemic behavior, self-attributions of the robot
were higher than when the robot behaved passively, but only at
the second measurement time. Conversely, other-attributions to
the robot were higher in the passive condition than the assertive
condition at both measurement times.
These analyses revealed differential changes in perceived attri-
butions over repeated interactions based on the proxemic behavior
expressed by the robot. For the passive proxemic behavior, there
was no signiﬁcant difference for the self-attributions between the
ﬁrst measure (M = 3.70, SE = 0.06) and the second measure
(M = 3.80, SE = 0.05), p = 0.082, though signiﬁcant differ-
ences were found for the other-attributions during the passive
behavior between the ﬁrst measure (M = 3.48, SE = 0.09) and
the second measure (M = 3.80, SE = 0.07), p < 0.001. For the
assertive proxemic behavior, there was a signiﬁcant increase in
self-attributions from the ﬁrst measure (M = 3.77, SE = 0.05) to
the second measure (M = 3.97, SE = 0.05), p < 0.001; however,
there was no signiﬁcant difference for other-attributions between
the ﬁrst measure (M = 3.16, SE = 0.08) to the second measure
(M = 3.24, SE = 0.09), p = 0.457. These results show that in the
passive condition, self-attributions of the robot remained stable
across repeated interactions, but there were increases in the other-
attributions. Conversely, when the robot behaved assertively there
FIGURE 4 |Three-way interaction between proxemic behavior
condition, time of measure, and mean scores for self- and
other-attributions as measured by the NMSPI.
was an increase across the interactions for the self-attributions,
but not for the other-attributions to the robot.
This interaction can also help address our research question
about the utility of the NMSPI as a measurement instrument to
assess mental state attribution. For the passive proxemic behav-
ior, participant ratings for other-attributions at the time of ﬁrst
measure were signiﬁcantly lower (M = 3.48, SE = 0.09) than the
self-attribution ratings (M = 3.70, SE= 0.06, p= 0.007). However,
at the time of the second measure in the passive condition, ratings
for self-attributions and other-attributions were not signiﬁcantly
different (M = 3.80, SE = 0.07 and M = 3.80, SE = 0.05 for other
and self respectively, p = 0.966). During the assertive proxemic
behavior condition, participant ratings were signiﬁcantly lower
for the other-attributions (M = 3.16, SE = 0.08) than for the self-
attributions (M = 3.77, SE = 0.05, p < 0.001). This remained
true for the second measure in the assertive condition (M = 3.24,
SE= 0.09 andM = 3.97, SE= 0.05 for other-attributions and self-
attributions respectively, p < 0.001). These results show that when
the robot was behaving according to the passive proxemic behav-
ior condition, differences in self-attributions of the robot and
other-attributions to the robot slowly disappeared over repeated
interactions while the difference remained stable over repeated
interactions when the robot behaved according to the assertive
behavioral programming.
The predicted effect of gaze on perceived social presence was
not signiﬁcant, [F(2,69) = 0.17, p = 0.846, η2p = 0.01] and the
predicted interaction between gaze and proxemic behavior was
also not signiﬁcant [F(2,69) = 2.66, p = 0.078, η2p = 0.07]. Thus,
there was no support for H1a and H3a. All other interactions were
also non-signiﬁcant, all F ≤ 2.01, all p ≥ 0.141, η2p = 0.054.
EMOTIONAL STATE ATTRIBUTIONS TO THE ROBOT
In order to examine our hypotheses concerning emotional states
attributed to the robot (H1b,H2b,H3b, andH4b), we next report a
series of analyses to understand the impact of proxemic behavior,
gaze, and time on the CMS. The results of emotional state attribu-
tions to the robot were ﬁrst examined along the two dimensions
of valence and arousal, as captured by the CMS. Given that partic-
ipants responded to the CMS by clicking on an image presented
on a computer screen, responses were saved as raster coordinates
as a function of the pixel location on the image. We ﬁrst con-
verted these raster coordinates to Cartesian coordinates in order
to analyze the dimensions of valence and arousal, where valence
was represented by the x-axis values and arousal was represented
by the y-axis values. For this conversion, the center point of the
CMS image was converted to (0, 0) and the perimeter converted
to encompass a space between −1 and +1 along both the x- and
y-axes.
We then conducted a 3 (gaze) × 2 (proxemic behav-
ior)× 2 (measurement time)× 2 (CMS dimension)mixed-model
ANOVA, with gaze as the between-subjects variable (congruent,
human-oriented, or variable), and proxemic behavior (assertive
or passive), time of CMS measure (after trial 1 or after trial 6 for
a given proxemic behavior) and CMS dimensions (valence and
arousal), as the within-subjects variables. Results showed a signif-
icant main effect for the two CMS dimensions [F(1,69) = 16.02,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.19], such that the dimension of arousal
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(M = 0.21) was rated as higher than the dimension of valence
(M = −0.01, p < 0.001), and a signiﬁcant main effect for time
of measure [F(1,69) = 4.11, p = 0.047, η2p = 0.06], such that the
second measure time (M = 0.13) had higher ratings than the ﬁrst
measure time (M = 0.07).
The main effects were further explained by an interaction
effect between proxemic behavior and the CMS dimensions,
[F(1,69) = 21.20, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.24]. Although the pre-
dicted main effect of proxemic behavior was non-signiﬁcant,
[F(1,69) = 0.66, p = 0.418, η2p = 0.01], follow-up pairwise
comparisons within the interaction, using Bonferroni correction,
examined the interaction between the two proxemic behavior con-
ditions and the two CMS dimensions. Results showed that valence
was signiﬁcantly greater during thepassive proxemic behavior con-
dition (M = 0.10, SE = 0.03) when compared to the assertive
condition (M = −0.11, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001). Further, arousal
was signiﬁcantly greater during the assertive proxemic behavior
condition (M = 0.29, SE = 0.04) when compared to the passive
condition (M = 0.13, SE= 0.05, p= 0.005). From these results and
examination of Figure 5, participants seemed to rate the emotion
of the robot as reﬂecting more positive valence and a lower level
of arousal when in the passive condition; whereas, in the assertive
condition, participants seemed to rate the emotion of the robot
with higher arousal and a negative valence. These ﬁndings lend
partial support to H2b.
The predicted main effect of gaze was not signiﬁcant
[F(2,69) = 1.87, p = 0.158, η2p = 0.05]. The predicted interac-
tion between proxemic behavior and gaze was also not signiﬁcant
[F(2,69) = 0.86, p = 0.426, η2p = 0.02]. All other results were
non-signiﬁcant and irrelevant to our hypotheses, all F ≤ 2.87, all
p ≥ 0.08, η2p ≤ 0.01.
A subsequent mixed-model ANOVA examined the results of
CMS responses on a third dimension, intensity, which reﬂects
the strength of the rating regardless of its valence or arousal.
To do so, we converted participant responses from the Cartesian
coordinates described above to Polar coordinates and the radius
value or the distance from the origin represented intensity. For
this 3 (gaze) × [2 (proxemic behavior) × 2 (measurement time)]
FIGURE 5 | Interaction between proxemic behavior condition and the
dimensions of mood as measured by the CMS.
mixed-model ANOVA, gaze (congruent, human-oriented, or vari-
able) was the between subjects variable, and proxemic behavior
(assertive or passive) and time of measure (after trial 1 or trial 6 for
a given proxemic behavior) were used as within-subjects variables.
Results showed amain effect for proxemic behavior [F(1,69) = 4.23,
p = 0.044, η2p = 0.06], such that the ratings in the assertive con-
dition (M = 0.65) were more intense than the passive condition
(M = 0.60). This ﬁnding also lends partial support to H2b.
Further, a signiﬁcant interaction was found between time and
gaze [F(2,69) = 3.70, p = 0.030, η2p = 0.10]. Despite the signiﬁcant
two-way interaction between measurement time and gaze on the
intensity of emotional attributions, follow-up pairwise compar-
isons with Bonferroni corrections did not reveal any signiﬁcant
difference within the three levels of gaze at either the ﬁrst and
secondmeasurement times (all p > 0.05). By contrast, when com-
paring each of the levels of gaze between the ﬁrst and second
measurement times (see Figure 6), results of pairwise compar-
isons with Bonferroni corrections indicated that, for variable gaze
only, the level of intensity was signiﬁcantly greater during the sec-
ond measurement time (M = 0.65, SE = 0.05) when compared to
the ﬁrst measurement time (M = 0.58, SE= 0.05, p = 0.05). These
results indicate that while there were no differences across the gaze
types and measurement times, there was a difference within the
variable gaze condition that showed an increase in intensity across
repeated interactions.
Lastly, a three-way interaction was found between proxemic
behavior, time, and gaze [F(2,69) = 6.90, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.17]
on intensity (see Figure 7). Tests of simple effects were com-
puted in order to conduct pairwise comparison between each
of the three variables at all levels. Results showed that, for
assertive proxemic behavior during the second time of measure-
ment, intensity for human gaze (M = 0.76, SE = 0.06) was
signiﬁcantly greater than congruent gaze (M = 0.50, SE = 0.05,
p = 0.004). Additionally, for human gaze during the second
measurement time, intensity was signiﬁcantly greater during the
assertive proxemic behavior condition (M = 0.76, SE = 0.06)
when compared to the passive condition (M = 0.64, SE = 0.06,
p = 0.023). By contrast, for congruent gaze during the ﬁrst
FIGURE 6 |Two-way interaction between measurement time and gaze
on intensity of emotional attributions measured by the CMS.
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FIGURE 7 |Three-way interaction between proxemic behavior,
measurement time, and gaze on intensity of emotional attributions
measured by the CMS.
measurement time, intensity was signiﬁcantly greater during the
assertive proxemic behavior condition (M = 0.66, SE = 0.05)
when compared to the passive condition (M = 0.54, SE = 0.06,
p = 0.032). Lastly, for congruent gaze during assertive prox-
emic behavior, intensity signiﬁcantly decreased from the ﬁrst
time it was measured (M = 0.66, SE = 0.05) when compared
to the second time it was measured (M = 0.50, SE = 0.05,
p = 0.001).
From these results and examination of Figure 7, this interac-
tion seems to be primarily driven by differences in the patterns
between the ﬁrst and second measurement during assertive prox-
emic behavior for the congruent gaze. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁgure
shows that, across the three gaze variables, there were increases
in intensity attributions between the ﬁrst and second measure-
ments in both proxemic behavior and for two of the three gaze
conditions, but not in the congruent gaze condition. Here, rather
than an increase in intensity of emotional attributions between
the ﬁrst and second assertive measurement, a decrease in inten-
sity occurred. These interaction effects with gaze, thus, provided
partial support for H3b and H4b.
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this research was to investigate how social cues
(gaze and proxemic behavior), instantiated in a mobile robot plat-
form, affected perceived social presence of the robot and how
humans would interpret those cues as social signals. Addition-
ally, this study examined changes in perceptions of a robot over
multiple interactions. Overall, we found that proxemic behavior
affected perceptions of the robot as a socially present agent and
led to different attributions of emotions. Speciﬁcally, participants
considered a robot that acted passively as a more socially present
agent than a robot that acted assertively. Participants also rated the
valence of emotions attributed to the robot in the passive condi-
tion as more positive than those of the assertive robot; and they
rated the arousal level attributed to the robot in the assertive con-
dition higher than in the passive condition. Perceptions of social
presence and emotional states also tended to increase over repeated
interactions, regardless of the robot’s gaze or proxemic behavior
programming.
In support of hypothesis H2a, ﬁndings from this experiment
regarding social presence suggest that, when the robot behaved in
accordance with the passive proxemic behavioral programming,
the robot was perceived as a more socially present agent. This may
be because the robot appeared to consider implicit social rules of
politeness during the shared navigation situation (see Tsui et al.,
2010). For example, giving the“right of way”when a path-crossing
event occurs, as was the case in the passive proxemic behavior con-
dition,may have led participants to perceive the robot as attending
to them and their behavior. In HHIs, attending to and responding
in a way that takes into consideration the interests of another has
been termed“socialmindfulness,” and appears to facilitate positive
perceptions of an entity (Van Doesum et al., 2013).
The results of the experiment did not supportH1a orH3a, indi-
cating that the gaze of the robot did not seem to be as important
a social cue for this speciﬁc scenario. Instead, gaze only appeared
to affect intensity of perceived emotional states when interacting
with the cue of proxemic behavior in our path-crossing scenario.
This implies that the manner in which the robot moved through
space mattered more than where the robot was perceived to be
looking during this particular shared navigation situation. These
results provide further evidence for the notion that the design of
robots intended for use in environments where social situations
are likely should account for ﬁndings that certain social cues better
afford the perception of a robot as a social agent. In doing so, it is
likely that this can increase the degree to which people can appro-
priately interpret social signals; that is, attribute mental states to a
robot and in turn, understand its intentions.
In support of H4a, the results also showed that the robot was
perceived as more socially present over repeated interactions. As
participants became more familiar with the robot behaving in
a certain way (i.e., passive or assertive), they increasingly saw it
as socially present and thus capable of having mental and emo-
tional states. This increase in perceived social presence is, however,
dependent on the social cues expressed and the context of the sit-
uation. For instance, in this study, the increase in perceived social
presence for the passive proxemic behavior condition was greater
than the increases for the assertive proxemic behavior condition.
But the robot also displayed a change in behaviormid-way through
the experiment that could also have contributed to this pattern of
increase in perceived social presence. One implication of this is
that, if humans are going to be required to interact with a robot
over a period of time, the ways in which certain social cues are
expressed will differentially affect the rate of increase in perceiving
the robot as a social agent. Notably, the repeated interactions in
this experiment still occurred over a relatively short period and,
as such, claims cannot be made regarding whether these ﬁndings
would hold true for repeated interactions that span days, weeks,
or months as will be the case in real-world implementations of
robotic systems.
IMPLICATIONS
The results from this experiment provide advances in both the-
oretical and practical understanding of social signals research in
the context of HRI as well as robotic design applications that can
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inform the intuitive exchange of social cues and signals essen-
tial to such interactions. This is particularly important given that
many robots that are being deployed will be non-humanoid. Our
research supports the notion that even non-humanoid robots can
convey social cues and that they are interpreted as meaningful
signals.
Our study also provides insights into understanding how to
measure intentions and attributions. We suggest that social pres-
ence is an important component of gaining access to intentional
and other mental states, particularly in the case of human inter-
actions with artiﬁcial intelligences or technologically mediated
others (Biocca and Harms, 2002). Additionally, the present study
examined perceptions of emotional states of a robot as this can also
be a key social signal providing information about the intentions
of an agent.
The study’s ﬁndings generally suggest that different social cues
elicit different emotional attributions, some of whichmay increase
over repeated interactions. When programmed to behave more
assertively, the robot was perceived as having emotional states that
were indicative of higher states of arousal. In addition, the intensity
of emotional state attributions were also greater when the robot
behaved assertively, particularly when comparing the gaze behav-
ior that was oriented to a person’s head with the gaze behavior
that focused only on the direction of navigation. Conversely, when
programmed to behave in a way that was more passive, more posi-
tive valence emotional attributions were made compared to when
the robot acted assertive. Further, across repeated interactions,
the social cues of robot gaze and proxemic behavior inﬂuenced
whether the intensity of emotional attributions increased, as in
the passive and assertive proxemic conditions with human or vari-
able gaze, or decrease, as in the assertive proxemic condition with
congruent gaze.
Taken together, these results support H2b, H3b, and H4b and
suggest that roboticists can leverage different social cues to con-
vey certain emotional states that provide information about the
intentions of a robot, regardless of whether that robot is capable
of having emotional states or not. For example, if a robot should
be regarded as having more positive emotional states, it should be
programmed to appear as a socially mindful agent (see Tsui et al.,
2010; Van Doesum et al., 2013). If the robot should be regarded
as more active or more aroused, possibly conveying a sense of
urgency, it should execute behaviors that appear more assertive
and without as much, if any, regard for those implicit social rules.
We also examined how participants responded regarding their
own perceptions of the robot (self-attributions) and how they
believed the robot perceived and thought about the participant
(other-attributions), as the latter requires engaging in theory of
mind. Our results showed differential changes in perceived social
presence and attributions of emotional states of mind depending
on proxemic condition. We also found that differences in self-
attributions of the robot and other-attributions to the robot slowly
disappeared over repeated interactions when the robot was behav-
ing according to the passive proxemic behavior condition. But,
in the assertive condition, the differences remained stable over
repeated interactions.
The current results provide support for the notion that endow-
ing robots with the capability of expressing social cues, such as
gaze behaviors and proxemic behaviors, results in them being
explicitly considered as social agents, in line with prior research
(e.g., Saulnier et al., 2011; Kahn et al., 2012a,b). One issue with
this interpretation is that the present study did not include either
a HHI condition or a human–computer interaction condition for
comparison. It may be that socially capable non-humanoid robots
are consideredmore socially present than a computer but less than
a real human, or that such a robot is considered as socially present
as a computer or a human. Future research in HRI is needed to
examine where varying types of robots may lie on this continuum
of potential social actors, in terms of social presence.
LIMITATIONS
There are several limitations present in the design of this study. The
context of the experiment, a shared navigation scenario within
a relatively narrow hallway involving path crossing, limits the
generalizability of our results. Subsequent studies would need to
conduct research across other shared navigation situations to fur-
ther tease apart the relationships between a robot’s expression of
social cues and how these are interpreted as social signals. Second,
the sample population in the present study consisted entirely of
college undergraduates. As social robots are likely to be deployed
across many contexts, it is crucial to understand how other popu-
lations perceive the robot. It is also worth noting that the present
study only examined two cues, gaze, and proxemic behavior.While
there were several ﬁndings relating to how proxemic behavior
affects perception of the robot, the gaze cue was not signiﬁcant.
This ﬁnding could be due to the relatively weak manipulation of
gaze in the present study. That is, the robot had a head with-
out a face, and the entire head-unit moved as a function of the
gaze programming. Many other studies that have found gaze to
be an important non-verbal social cue examined it in robots with
more robust facial features, such as eyes (e.g., Mutlu et al., 2009;
Takayama and Pantofaru, 2009; Mumm andMutlu, 2011; Saulnier
et al., 2011).
One additional point needs to be made regarding our instruc-
tions to participants to respond using the CMS to attribute an
emotional state to the robot. This could be construed as biasing
the participants to believe the robot was truly capable of hav-
ing emotional states. However, the present experiment was not
intended to investigate whether or not people believe robots have
emotions, but, instead, to examine what emotional states they felt
the robot was exhibiting. Participants were informed during the
training phase that the center point of the CMS was indicative of
a neutral emotion, and, in fact, a number of our participants did
select the central regions throughout the experiment. The cases
where participants did attribute an emotional state to the robot as
a function of the social cues displayed and repeated interactions
were what were of primary interest to us.
CONCLUSION
Despite the aforementioned limitations, it is important to iterate
the speciﬁc contributions of the present study as these include
an integrated set of factors. First, the experiment was conducted
in a realistic setting in which participants had actual interactions
with a robot programmed to convey multiple social cues. This is
in contrast to the use of simulated or “man behind the curtain”
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type experiments that are prevalent in HRI. Next, we were able
to examine changes over time as the participants interacted with
the robot across multiple trials and responded to the measures
multiple times. Additionally,manyHRI experiments rely onobser-
vational data (e.g., the distance participants maintained from the
robot) or subjective measures of participants’ attitudes about a
given robot or robots in general. We used measures that assessed
varying mental states that participants could attribute to a robot
even though it, in fact, possessed no mental states. This leads to
another novel contribution of the research in terms of the way
in which the NMSPI was analyzed. We suggest that parsing the
scale along the self- and other-dimensions is a unique contribu-
tion that should be pursued in future HRI studies. Lastly, the use
of a multi-dimensional single-item measure for attributing emo-
tional states (CMS) to a robot is a unique contribution and one
that has broad applicability for not only research in HRI, but also
HHI as well.
In closing, the expression of social cues by a robot determines
how it is perceived as a social agent capable of having mental and
emotional states. This is important to consider as robots transition
not just from sterile, industrial settings to dynamic, social contexts,
but also as robots transition from tools to potential team mem-
bers (Fiore et al., 2008; Phillips et al., 2011;Wiltshire et al., 2013a).
Roboticists can leverage ﬁndings such as the ones presented here,
and those that build upon our efforts, to design robots that project
cues enabling humans to make accurate mental state attributions
and, potentially, predict robot actions as they interact in service of
collaboratively meeting goals and completing tasks.
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